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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Leonard Unger

Chairman, Vietnam Coordinating

Committee

Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

Department of State Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT:

Location and Significance of Electric Powerplants in the Hanoi-Haiphong Power Network of North

Vietnam

REFERENCES:

1.

Memorandum to the Secretary, from W.W. Rostow, Subject: An Electric Power Cut-Through in

North Vietnam, dated 1 April 1965

1. Eight thermal electric powerplants in the Hanoi-Haiphong power network serve about 90 percent of North Vietnam's industry and about 15 percent of its population. Effective interdiction of the electric power supplied by these eight powerplants would bring to a halt modern industry and many municipal services in the area served by the Hanoi-Haiphong network. The exact locations of the eight powerplants are known from aerial photography. Destruction of substations in the network would interrupt all but a small amount of the power supply for six months; destruction of boiler houses at the eight powerplants would cut off supply from these powerplants for, probably, a year or two.

2. The present memorandum does not discuss the operational
problem of whether the installations of the Hanoi-Haiphong electric
power network can be hit in proper fashion, or the advisability of
nitting these installations as a method of dissuading the North
Vietnamese from pursuing their aims in South Vietnam. These sub-
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connected to them. Effective interdiction of the eight powerplants would not only bring modern industry in the area to a halt but would also cause difficulties at the coal port of Cam Pha that relies to a great extent on electric-powered equipment. (The port of Haiphong is not extensively electrified.)

- 4. The Uong-bi, Hon-gay, and Thai Nguyen powerplants with about 46 percent of total grid capacity are located in relatively open areas, whereas the other five powerplants are generally in heavily populated areas.
- 5. The eight powerplants shown in Annex B contain 77 percent of the total powerplant capacity of North Vietnam, furnish about 80 percent of the electricity used by final consumers in the country, and about 90 percent of the electricity used by industry. About 90 percent of the power supplied to final consumers by the network is believed to be used for industry. (The term "final consumers" identifies all consumption except that by electric power generating plants. The term also excludes transmission losses.)
- 6. The major industrial consumers of electric power in the area are the Haiphong cement plant, coal mines in the Hon Gay area, the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant, the Nam Dinh cotton textile plant, the Hanoi machine building plant, and the paper, chemical, and fertilizer plants near Viet Tri. Each of these enterprises is the major, if not the only, producer of its kind in the country.

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ANNEX I

Location, Capacity, and Significance of Major Thermal Electric Powerplants in the Hanoi-Haiphong Power Network of North Vietnam

Name and Location a/ of Powerplant	<u>Capacity</u> (Megawatts	User and Approximate) <u>Consumption in 1964 b/</u> (Million kilowatt-hours)	•
Haiphong TPP <u>c</u> /Cement (20-51-45N; 106-40-18E)	12.0	Haiphong Cement Plant	50
Haiphong TPP (20-52-08N; 106-42-45E)	5.5	Town and Port of Haiphong Agriculture in Haiphong area	10 5
Hanoi TPP (21-02-28N: 105-50-51E)	32.5	Hanoi Machine Building Plant Other industry in Hanoi Non-industrial use in Hanoi area	20 30 30
Non Gay TPP (20-56-28N; 107-06-50E)	15.0	Coal mining in area Coal part of Cam Pha	30 10
dem Dinh TPP (20-24-55N; 106-10-23E)	7.5	Nam Dinh Cotton Textile Plant Town of Nam Dinh	20 5
Thai Nguyen TPP (21-33-29N; 105-52-15E)	24.0	Iron and Steel Plant Iron ore mines Export to Hanoi	20 10 30
Viet Tri TPP (21-17-48N; 105-25-10E)	16.0	Viet Tri Chemical Combine Lam Thao Superphosphate plant Viet Tri paper plant	10 10 10
Uong Bi TPP (21-02-12N; 106-47-22E)	24.0	Hon Gay coal mines Haiphong Hanoi	10 10 40
Total Network Capacity and U	se <u>136.0</u>		360
Total National Capacity and	Use 175		450
Hanoi-Haiphong Network as a percent of Total National	77		80